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The Legality of Nuclear Weapons: A
Response to Corwin
Eric J. G. McFadden*
I. Introduction
In an article published in the Spring, 1987 issue of this journal,1
author David Corwin presents a cogent and thought-provoking argu-
ment in support of his contention that the use of nuclear weapons is
illegal under international law. Corwin's article is one of the latest in
a series of works in recent years that have advanced this argument in
one form or another.' While I share these writers' revulsion of nu-
clear weapons, I must part company with their contention that cur-
rent principles of international law render the possession or use of
such armaments illegal under all circumstances. Corwin's compre-
hensive analysis provides an excellent framework for examining the
validity of these arguments. It will be my contention in this article
that text of relevant treaty provisions, principles of customary inter-
national law and state practice rebut Corwin's assertion that the use
of nuclear weapons is circumscribed under international law.
At this point, the reader may fairly ask the question: assuming,
arguendo, that nuclear weapons can be legally deployed and used in
battle, what purpose is served by presenting such a discouraging
message in a public forum? It is my belief that the efforts of the
* Director, Midwest Office, Pacific Center For International Studies, Madison, Wiscon-
sin. All of the opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the position of the Pacific Center For International Studies.
1. Corwin, The Legality of Nuclear Arms Under International Law, 5 DICK. J. INT'L L.
271 (1987).
2. See, e.g., C. WEERAMANTRY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SCIENTIFIC RESPONSIBILITY
(1987); Arbess & Sahaydachny, Nuclear Deterrence and International Law: Some Steps To-
ward Observance, 17 ALTERNATIVES 83 (1987); NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LAW (A. Miller &
M. Feinrider eds. 1984) [hereinafter Miller & Feinrider]; Rubin, Nuclear Weapons and Inter-
national Law, FLETCHER FORUM 45 (Winter 1984); Weston, Nuclear Weapons Versus Inter-
national Law: A Contextual Reassessment, 28 MCGILL L. REV. 342 (1984); Falk, Is Nuclear
Policy A War Crime?, 1I HUMAN RIGHTS 18 (1983); Fried, International Law Prohibits The
First Use of Nuclear Weapons, 16 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 33 (1981-82);
Fujita, First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Strategy vs. International Law, 3 KANSAS U.
REV. L. & POL. 57 (1982); Falk, Meyrowitz & Sanderson, Nuclear Weapons and Interna-
tional Law, 20 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 541 (1981) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons and International
Law]. For an excellent summary of legal analyses on this issue in the last forty years, see
Meyrowitz, The Opinions of Legal Scholars on the Legal Status of Nuclear Weapons, 24
STAN. J. INT'L L. III (1987).
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world community to create a safer and saner world through nuclear
arms control negotiations would actually be enhanced by reconciling
itself to the fact that international law, at least in its current state of
development, does not render nuclear weapons illegal. This is true
for two reasons.
First, those who steadfastly insist that nuclear weapons are ille-
gal might do well to heed the admonition of Sophocles that "What
you cannot enforce, do not command." ' Even if we accept the pro-
position that nuclear weapons are "illegal," the brutal fact remains
that superpowers and their allies have blatantly and consistently de-
fied this precept. The United States and the Soviet Union currently
possess approximately 50,000 nuclear weapons between them, and
both sides have stated their intention to use these weapons unde cer-
tain circumstances. 5 China, while maintaining a relatively small ar-
senal of only approximately 300 to 400 warheads, has embarked on a
program to modernize and expand its forces at the rate of 10-20%
per year.6 In Europe, Great Britain and France maintain substantial
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and both nations have launched mod-
ernization programs in recent years.7 Finally, a number of other na-
tions have developed, or are on the threshold of developing, the capa-
bility to produce nuclear weapons. This growing list includes Israel,8
India,9 Argentina,10 Brazil," Iraq,"2 Pakistan, a and South Africa. 4
3. SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS AT COLONUS.
4. Forsberg, The Freeze and Beyond, in THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL (D. Ball & A.
Mack, eds. 1987), at 70, NUCLEAR WEAPONS DATABOOK WORKING PAPER 87-2, U.S. Nu-
clear Stockpile 1980-1987 (1987).
5. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 2, at 50 n.10; Rosas, Negative Security Assurances and
Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons, 25 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 199, 201-02 (1982).
6. SIPRI, WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK 67 & 103 (1986).
7. Id. at 60-67; see also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL:
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 16 (1985).
8. Mordechai Vanunu, a former technician in Israel's nuclear program claims that Israel
may currently possess between 100 and 200 nuclear weapons and began producing a form of
advanced nuclear weapon that relies on thermonuclear fusion, the principle of hydrogen
bombs, in the early 1980s. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation: Who's Next?, BULL. ATOM. SCI.,
May 1987, at 17; see also Cohen & Frankel, Israel's Nuclear Ambiguity, BULL. ATOM. SCI.,
Mar., 1987, at 15.
9. One recent study projects that within several years India may have the capability to
produce 6-20 weapons annually. L. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TODAY 55-56 (1984);
see also Thomas, India's Nuclear Programs And The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 5
WIs. INT'L L.J. 108, 109 (1986); Hazarika, India Tests Its Own Surface-to-Surface Missile,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1988, at A5. By 1991, India may possess more than 100 bombs of the
size that destroyed Hiroshima. Spector & Stahl, Cooling The Arms Race In South Asia,
BULL. ATOM. SCI., April, 1988, at 32.
10. Nye, The Logic of Inequality, 59 FOREIGN POL'Y 126 (1985); see also, Poneman,
Nuclear Proliferation Prospects For Argentina 27 ORBis 876 (1984).
11. Myers, Brazil: Reluctant Pursuit of the Nuclear Option, 27 ORBIS 906 (1984); see
also Redick, Latin America: Reducing The Threat of Nuclear Proliferation, 5 WIS. INT'L L.J.
79, 94-96 (1986).
12. L. SPECTOR, supra note 9, at 188.
13. Pakistan may currently have the capability to produce three nuclear warheads per
year. Kumar, Nuclear Nexus Between Peking and Islamabad: An Overview of Some Signifi-
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One recent study has projected that as many as twenty nations may
have a nuclear weapons capability by 1995.11 Most of the newcomers
to the "nuclear club" have pursued the development of nuclear
weapons as a response to perceived threats from inveterate regional
enemies.' 6 In the face of this reality, any claim that nuclear weapons
are illegal only breeds disrespect for the international legal system,
as its impotence to enforce this purported legal principle is demon-
strated daily.
Second, polemics by national policy makers devoted to the legal-
ity or illegality of nuclear weapons diverts their attention from ef-
forts to develop viable arms agreements that may enhance strategic
stability and world security. As one commentator has recently con-
cluded, the "moralized conception of nuclear weaponry. . . has mil-
itated against diplomacy. It has deflected attention from the possibil-
ity of collaboration based on mutual interests (such as the prevention
and management of regional crises) by its stress on the alleged in-
compatibility of fundamental values."" As disheartening as the fact
may be, the international legal system is likely to have virtually no
influence over the military decision-making of a nation that considers
the possession of nuclear weapons to be an indispensable component
of national security.
This Article will attempt to demonstrate that the use of nuclear
weapons is a legal method of warfare under a broad range of cir-
cumstances. It is my hope that by demonstrating the futility of the
line of reasoning pursued by Mr. Corwin and others, I can encourage
a reorientation of efforts in the direction of meaningful negotiations
to reduce the peril of the nuclear arms race. In this pursuit, I will
first address Mr. Corwin's contention that certain international trea-
ties, as well as principles of customary international law, render the
use of nuclear weapons illegal under virtually all circumstances. Sec-
ond, I will examine the inapplicability of principles of international
law in the context of nuclear weapons. Finally, I will suggest some
alternative proposals that might more efficaciously contribute to
cant Developments, 21 ISSUES & STUDIES 143 (1985); see also Kapur, Nuclear Proliferation:
A False Threat?, 10 INT'L PERSP. 9 (1984). By 1991, it has been estimated that Pakistan
could have as many as 15 devices the size of that which destroyed Hiroshima. Spector &
Stahl, supra note 9, at 32.
14. "With its own uranium enrichments plants, South Africa may now have the capabil-
ity to produce 15-25 devices, soon maybe 40, the same size as the U.S. arsenal in 1948."
SPECTOR, supra note 9, at 304-05; see also Kapur, supra note 13, at 7-8; Pabian, Reviewing
The Evidence on South Africa And The Bomb, BULL. ATOM. Sci., April, 1988, at 47.
15. Sakamoto, Reversing Militarized Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific Region, 2 NON-
ALIGNED WORLD 400 (1984).
16. McFadden, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones: Toward An International Framework, 16
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 217, 219 (1986).
17. Malcomson, Moral Virtue and Nuclear Strategy, 2 PEACE & SECURITY, Autumn,
1987, at 4-5.
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helping the world retreat from the abyss of a nuclear holocaust.
II. Nuclear Weapons and the Laws of War
A. Overview
At the outset of his article, Corwin correctly observes that "no
treaty explicitly addresses the legality of all uses of nuclear weap-
ons." 18 Indeed, as several commentators have observed, there is no
treaty of a global character that bans the use of nuclear weapons
under all circumstances. 19 This fact is particularly problematical for
Corwin's analysis in light of the Permanent Court of International
Justice's decision in The Case of the S.S. Lotus2 0 In the Lotus case,
the government of Turkey sought to prosecute the captain of a
French steamer that collided with a ship flying the Turkish flag on
the high seas. The French government contended that Turkey could
not claim jurisdiction over a French citizen in an accident that oc-
curred on the high seas absent "some title to jurisdiction recognized
by international law in favour of Turkey." 1 The Turkish govern-
ment countered this argument by contending that it could properly
assume jurisdiction absent proof that this act would contravene a
principle of international law.
In upholding Turkey's assumption of jurisdiction, the World
Court established the now universally-recognized principle that a na-
tion is permitted to take any action that is not explicitly proscribed
under principles of international law. The Court based its holding on
the consensual nature of international law, averring:
International law governs relations between independent
States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate
from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages
generally accepted as expressing principles of law and estab-
lished in order to regulate the relations between those co-ex-
isting independent communities or with a view to the achieve-
18. Corwin, supra note 1, at 272.
19. See, e.g., Rosas, Negative Security Assurances and Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons,
25 GERM. YB. INT'L L. 199, 201 (1982); Bring & Reimann, Addressing A Wrong Question:
The 1977 Protocols Additional To The 1949 Geneva Conventions And The Issue of Nuclear
Weapons, 33 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 99, 99 (1986); DeGarmo & Richards, Are Nuclear Weap-
ons Illegal?, 5 CAL. LAW. 9, 9 (1985). While several international agreements bar use of
nuclear weapons in limited geographical areas, such as the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nu-
clear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 754, T.I.A.S. No. 7137, 634
U.N.T.S. 281, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S.L. 205, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the
Employment of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and
Ocean Floor, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.1.A.S. No. 7337, 995 U.N.T.S. 115, none of
these agreements declare that nuclear weapons are illegal in a general sense. Bring & Rei-
mann, at 100 n.1.
20. (1927) P.C.1.J., ser. A, No. 9 (France v. Turkey) [hereinafter S.S. Lotus].
21. Id. at 21.
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ment of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of
States cannot therefore be presumed.2"
Finding no principle of international law that limited the freedom of
a nation to assume jurisdiction under the circumstances of the case,
the Court held that Turkey could legitimately try the French na-
tional in its courts.23
The overarching principle established in the Lotus case is ger-
mane to the determination of the legality of nuclear weapons. The
absence of an explicit agreement by the nations of the world to
render nuclear weapons illegal establishes a strong presumption
against any assertion that such a rule exists.
Corwin seeks to counter this contention by maintaining that sev-
eral treaties and principles of customary international law restrict
the use of nuclear weapons because of "the inevitable consequences
and effects that would stem from any use of nuclear weapons. 24 At
this point, Corwin is certainly on unsteady ground, as he is reduced
to arguing that nuclear weapons are, at the most, only impliedly ren-
dered illegal by international agreements and customary principles
of international law.
Additionally, it is difficult to conceive of a more paramount at-
tribute of national sovereignty than the right to protect the State's
security interests. As a consequence, the Lotus court's admonition
that restrictions on sovereignty should never be presumed is particu-
larly salient in the context of the debate about the legality of nuclear
weapons.2"
B. Unnecessary Suffering
Corwin argues at the outset of this section of his article that
international law requires combatants to "minimize the degree of
suffering and destruction caused to opposing forces," citing the 1868
Declaration of St. Petersburg and the Hague Convention in 1907.6
22. Id. at
23. Id. at
24. Corwin, supra note 1, at 272-73.
25. See also Almond, Nuclear Fear Shall Make Us Free I I HUMAN RIGHTS, Winter,
1983, at 24 [hereinafter Almond, Nuclear Fear]. Additionally, domestic courts are usually
chary to give a liberal construction to statutes that carry criminal penalties because of the
gravity of the sanctions attendant to conviction. Similarly, jus in bello principles should be
narrowly construed as individual combatants found to have violated such laws are subject to
criminal conviction as war criminals. See, e.g., Baxter, So Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency'..
Spies, Guerrillas and Saboteurs, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. 323 (1951); Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S.
1, 31, 34, 36 (1942). As a consequence, we should be hesitant to read "implied" limitations on
the use of certain weapons into such laws absent compelling evidence that such conduct was
intended to be proscribed.
26. Corwin, supra note 1, at 273-74; see also St. Petersburg Declaration, 1868, re-
printed in I AM. J. INT'L L. 95-96 (Supp. 1907); see also The Hague Convention Respecting
the Law and Customs of War on Land 1907, art. 23, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (effective
Feb. 28, 1910) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
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Corwin also cites the prohibition of means of warfare that result in
"treacherous killing" or "unnecessary suffering" outlined in the
Hague Convention. While Corwin vows to apply only the "literal
meaning" of these documents,28 the long history of disputes between
States involving treaty interpretation demonstrates the fact that
"cases when . . . the unambiguity of the text is so much beyond
doubt as to make any further investigation unnecessary, are ex-
tremely rare." '29 The Hague Convention and the Declaration of St.
Petersburg are well-recognized customary principles of international
law. However, Corwin immediately runs into trouble when he strives
to apply the broad language of these principles in the context of nu-
clear weapons. First, he is forced to admit that the term "unneces-
sary suffering" in Article 23 of the Hague Convention is an "inher-
ently pliable" concept that is simply too vague to render the use of
nuclear weapons in combat expressly illegal:
The standard used to determine whether or not the use of a
particular weapon constitutes unnecessary suffering has never
been authoritatively set forth . . . The most common standard
of "unnecessary suffering" balances the harm caused by the
weapon against the necessity of the military goals sought to be
achieved . . . An argument can be made that the use of nuclear
weapons does not violate either standard. A nation can point to
the necessity of a particular usage of nuclear arms using tradi-
tional national defense and national security justifications . . .
[TIhe great elasticity of this standard suggests that this defense
would be invoked as a matter of course, no matter what degree
of destruction was wrought upon a particular population."0
While Corwin seeks to salvage this argument by asserting that any
combatant's invocation of military necessity to justify the use of nu-
clear weapons would have to be tested on a case-by-case basis, this is
a substantial retreat from his overarching contention that nuclear
weapons are illegal per se.
Corwin's invocation of the Hague Convention's "unnecessary
suffering" language is infirm for two additional reasons. First, while
Corwin charitably terms this language "inherently pliable," in real-
ity it establishes no standard at all by which to test standards of
conduct in times of war. While the term "unnecessary" perhaps was
left undefined in the Hague Convention to avoid controversy among
treaty signatories, some have suggested that a reasonable definition
of the concept would be any suffering which is unnecessary "in rela-
27. Corwin, supra note 1, at 274.
28. Corwin, supra note I, at 273.
29. G. HARASZTI, SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE LAW OF TREATIES 94 (1973).
30. Corwin, supra note 1, at 274-75.
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tion to the military advantage to be derived from the use of the
weapon."'" This definition closely parallels the customary jus in
bello principle of proportionality which requires that "the loss of life
and damage to property must not be out of proportion to the military
advantage to be gained." 32 The problem posed by this balancing test
is that one is compelled to weigh two unlike quantities and values.
How does one weigh the saliency of a military objective against the
possible loss of life that might occur in pursuing that objective? The
simple fact is that this section of the Hague Convention is ill
equipped to provide meaningful criteria for the conduct of armed
conflict.
A second problem with invoking this language to question the
legality of nuclear weapons is that the section explicitly provides that
only the use of weapons or materials "calculated" to cause unneces-
sary suffering is prohibited.33 This provision embodies the intention
of the drafters to prohibit only the use of weapons that inflict super-
fluous injury while furthering no valid military objective:
This provision was intended to prohibit the use of weapons
which just added gratuitous suffering or pain to a wounded per-
son while serving no valid military purpose. The reasoning be-
hind this provision was that if one had already put a man out of
action by putting a projectile through him, there was no military
utility in altering the projectile or putting poison on the projec-
tile so that the disabled soldier would die a horrible death from
the effect of the poison or the alteration . . . Whether or not one
agrees with the reasoning, one must, I believe, concede that the
draftsmen of the Conventions were trying to draw a sensible line
between what was militarily necessary and what caused injury
3 1. Mallison, The Laws of War and Juridical Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction
in General and Limited Wars, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 33 (1967).
32. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL No. 7-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE
(1956); D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (1958). McDougal and Felici-
ano's formulation of the proportionality standard suggests that a "reasonableness" standard
should be utilized to construe Art. 23(e) of the Hague Regulations:
[Tihe fundamental policy of minimum unnecessary destruction may be seen
to underlie questions of legitimacy . . . [Wjhere the suffering or deprivation of
values incidental to the use of a particular weapon is not excessively dispropor-
tionate to the military advantage accruing to the belligerent user, the violence
and the weapon by which it is effected may be regarded as permissible. All war
instruments are "cruel" and "inhuman" in the sense that they cause destruction
and human suffering. It is not, however, the simple fact of destruction, nor even
the amount thereof, that is relevant in the appraisal of such instruments; it is
rather the needlessness, the superfluity of harm, the gross imbalance between the
military result, and the incidental injury that is commonly regarded as decisive
of illegitimacy.
M. McDOUGLAS & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 7 (1961).
33. The precise language of article 23(e) of the Hague Convention reads: "[lit is espe-
cially forbidden: (e) to employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering." Hague Convention, supra note 26, art. 23(e).
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that had no military advantage. 4
Corwin would be hard-pressed to argue that nuclear weapons
were designed with the intent to inflict superfluous injury on the bat-
tlefield, or that their use would necessarily produce this result. Nu-
clear weapons have been integrated into the battle plans of those
nations who possess them to fulfill discrete military objectives. The
use of nuclear armaments in combat would undoubtedly inflict sub-
stantial pain and suffering on opposing combatants. However, the
Hague Convention was not drafted to proscribe the use of any
weapon that causes suffering, rather only those armaments that are
designed solely to cause damage beyond that necessary to pursue the
legitimate objectives of combat.
Corwin next attempts to bolster his position by invoking an al-
ternative interpretation of the term "unnecessary suffering."35 Under
this argument, the "indiscriminate destruction" caused by nuclear
weapons would almost necessarily result in unnecessary suffering and
thus would violate the Hague Convention.3" Corwin seeks to extend
this argument by contending that any nuclear weapon exploded near
a civilian population would cause incidental civilian casualties, and
thus "even the smallest of nuclear arms would be inherently incapa-
ble of avoiding destruction unnecessary to the military goal."3
This line of reasoning is flawed for several reasons. First, this
incredibly rigid standard, apparently condemning any attack that
may cause incidental civilian casualties, would render the use of
most contemporary weapons illegal. In short, this is an impossible
standard that would necessarily and, summarily be rejected by na-
tions because it precludes virtually all forms of modern combat.
Second, Corwin's portrayal of jus in bello principles is simply
misguided. As one commentator recently stated, "[tihe legality of
attacks during wartime is not restricted to those that might cause
damage exclusively to legitimate military objectives, because this
would be impossible. Some civilian casualties must be anticipated or
indirect damage incurred."3
The scope of permissible military targets has expanded in the
Twentieth Century to include military installations located near or
within urban areas-, as well as industrial sites located in cities. a9 This
34. Cummings, The Role of Humanitarian Law, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 269, 71
(1983).
35. This interpretation is suggested to Corwin by Falk, Meyorwitz & Sanderson in their
1980 article on nuclear weapons. Nuclear Weapons and International Law, supra note 2; see
also Corwin, supra note 1, at 274.
36. Nuclear Weapons and International Law, supra note 2, at 542-43.
37. Corwin, supra note 1, at 275.
38. Almond, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Strategy and Law, 15 DEN. J. INT'L & POL'Y
283, 287 (1987) [hereinafter Almond, Nuclear Weapons].
39. Stowell, The Laws of War And The Atomic Bomb, 30 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 785
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expansion of the purview of legitimate military objectives reflects the
belief that: "today the whole nation is in arms and the victory is won
by breaking the will of the whole nation to continue the fight;" and
"practically every phase of national activity contributes to the sup-
port and success of warfare."40 While this new orientation necessa-
rily makes incidental civilian casualties inevitable, the world commu-
nity has come to recognize the legality of such actions. Thus, while it
is illegal under relevant principles of international law to make civil-
ians the direct target of a military attack, an attack on a legitimate
military target which results in incidental civilian deaths would not
constitute a breach of the Hague Convention. This distinction was
explicated in the decision of the United States Military Tribunal in
United States v. Ohlendorf:
A city is bombed for tactical purposes; communications are
to be destroyed, railroad wrecked, ammunition plants demol-
ished, factories razed, all for the purpose of impeding the mili-
tary. In these operations it inevitably happens that nonmilitary
persons are killed. This is an incident, a grave incident to be
sure, but an unavoidable corollary of battle action. The civilians
are not individualized. The bomb falls, it is aimed at the rail-
road yards, houses along the tracks are hit and many of their
occupants killed. But that is entirely different, both in fact and
in law, from an armed force marching up to the same railroad
tracks entering those houses abutting thereon, dragging out the
men, women, and children and shooting them.4'
While the Nuremberg Tribunal prosecuted a few military of-
ficers for aerial bombing of civilian sites during World War II, it
"summarily rejected cases in which the target included military
objectives."" 2 Article 52 of the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Con-
ventions48 similarly provides that military attacks must be strictly
limited to "military objectives," which is defined as "those objects
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time,
offers a definite military advantage. '44 However, Article 57 recog-
nizes that incidental civilian casualties are an inevitable byproduct of
such an attack on military objectives, and requires only that every
(1945).
40. Id.
41. 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 467 (1947).
42. Note, The United States' Nuclear First Strike Position: A Legal Appraisal Of Its
Ramifications, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 508, 521 (1977).
43. Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention of 1949 (Protocols I & II), opened
for signature Dec. 12, 1977, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1391, 1444 (1977).
44. Id. at Art. 57, para. 2.
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effort must be made to minimize such incidental losses of civilian
lives and civilian objects. This provision further provides that com-
batants must refrain from launching attacks which would likely
cause incidental losses of civilian lives, injuries, or property damage
"which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct mili-
tary advantage anticipated.""5 Thus, once again, military decisions
are to be controlled by a standard of reasonability and
proportionality.
By no means, would I argue that the standards outlined above
give nations that possess nuclear weapons carte blanche to use such
armaments under any circumstances that they may see fit. For ex-
ample, the principle of proportionality and the need to balance mili-
tary objectives against loss of life would most likely prohibit any de-
cision to use nuclear weapons in an urban area if the sole objective
was to strike at a small number of military or industrial facilities
within the perimeter of the city. However, it is less likely that the
use of tactical weapons against a more isolated military command
post, or the use of strategic nuclear forces against ICBM silos in an
area somewhat removed from a civilian population area, would be
considered illegal under the Hague Convention or general principles
of proportionality.
Consistent with Corwin's thesis, his probable response to this
line of reasoning would be to argue that any "limited" use of nuclear
weapons that might comport with international standards for the
conduct of war would almost inevitably escalate into an uncontrolla-
ble conflagration that would assuredly violate such principles. The
critical flaw in this line of reasoning is that it fails to differentiate
between illegality per se and illegality through misuse:
While there is grave risk that the use of tactical nuclear
weapons, or the impacts of massive force imposed by conven-
tional weapons, or even military doctrine, might lead to a large
scale use nuclear weapons of greater destructive force, none of
these facts alone enables us to condemn such weapons under the
existing law. Misuse of nuclear weapons, such as uses contrary
to the legal principle of military necessity, are violations of the
law of war, as is the use of other weapons under these
conditions."'
45. Id. at Art. 57, para. 2(iii).
46. Almond Nuclear Weapons, supra note 37, at 288. The U.S. Air Force's treatise on
international law and armed conflict also emphasizes this distinction, stating:
The extent to which a weapon discriminates between military objectives and
protected persons and objects depends usually on the manner in which the
weapon is employed rather than on the design qualities of the weapon itself.
Where a weapon is designed so that it can be used against military objectives, its
employment in a different manner, such as against the civilian population, does
not make the weapon itself unlawful. Indiscriminate weapons are those incapable
[Vol. 6:3
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Thus, I contend that, contrary to Corwin's assertion, nuclear weap-
ons are not illegal per se under international law. Rather the legality
standard is dependent upon the manner in which the weapons are
militarily utilized.
C. Nuclear Weapons and the Geneva Protocol
Corwin's next argument in support of the illegality per se of
nuclear arms under international law is that use of such weapons
would violate the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925.47 Under the Conven-
tion, the use in war of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and
of all analogous liquid, materials or devices" is prohibited. 8 Corwin
seeks to discount the fact that the treaty does not explicitly prohibit
nuclear weapons by arguing that the general language of the Proto-
col mandates a broad interpretation. Beyond the fact that Corwin
cites no express authority for this purported rule of treaty interpreta-
tion, he once again ignores the World Court's admonition in the Lo-
tus case that restrictions on national sovereignty should not lightly
be assumed absent clear evidence of consent.6 0
Several commentators have argued that the radiation produced
by a nuclear blast would constitute a "poisonous" substance, thus
rendering nuclear weapons illegal under the Protocol." As Corwin
observes, this argument has been "vigorously disputed."62 In advanc-
ing the contention that nuclear weapons do not fall within the Ge-
neva Gas Protocol, one commentator begins with a commonly ac-
cepted definition of poison as "any agent which, introduced . . . into
an organism, may chemically produce an injurious or deadly ef-
fect."" While acknowledging that nuclear radiation would produce
an injurious chemical effect upon those exposed to an atomic blast, it
is then questioned whether radiation constitutes an "agent," which is
defined as "an active principle; a substance of element capable of
of being controlled, through design or function, and thus they cannot, with any
degree of certainty, be directed at military objectives.
DEPT. OF THE AIR FORCE. AFP 110-31, INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CONDUCT OF ARMED
CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS 6-3 (1976).
47. Protocol Prohibiting the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter Geneva
Gas Protocol].
48. Id.
49. Corwin, supra note 1, at 277.
50. For a discussion of the Lotus case and its reasoning, see supra text accompanying
notes 20-23.
51. See, e.g., Meyrowitz, The Laws of War and Nuclear Weapons, in Miller &
Feinrider, supra note 2, at 29; G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 194
(1971).
52. Corwin, supra note 1, at 277; citing Comment, The United States' Nuclear First
Strike Position: A Legal Appraisal of its Ramifications, CAL. W.L. REv. 508, 524 (1977).
53. Bright, Nuclear Weapons As A Lawful Means of Warfare, 30 MIL. L. REV. 1, 17
(1965).
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producing a reaction."5
Under this analysis, the initial radiation produced by the deto-
nation of a nuclear weapon is composed primarily of neutrons and
gamma rays, neither of which constitute a "substance." 55 Although
it is acknowledged that residual nuclear radiation - such as radio-
active fallout - is composed of solid particles, most of the physio-
logical damage from these substances occurs from sources outside of
the body. Thus, insofar as such substances do not produce internal
reactions in human beings, they do not constitute "poisons. 56
Corwin further argues that the Protocol's prohibition of the use
in war of substances that are "analogous" to poisonous gases would
also render nuclear weapons illegal. " This contention does very lit-
tle to strengthen Corwin's position. Given the preceding analysis, we
must conclude that the hazardous effects of nuclear weapons are cre-
ated by forces that are fundamentally different than "poisonous"
substances. To that extent, it is difficult to see how nuclear weapons
could be construed to be "analogous" to poisonous gases.
Second, forty-one of the States that have ratified the Protocol,
including all five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council,
have reserved the right to retaliate in kind to a chemical attack.5 a
Thus, if nations possessing nuclear weapons are subject to the Proto-
col, it arguably only prohibits the first use of such weapons. 9
D. Combatant and Noncombatant Distinction
Corwin's next argument is that the use of nuclear weapons
would obviate the distinction between combatants and civilians pro-
vided for in the Hague Draft Rules on Aerial Warfare and the 1977
Geneva Protocol.10 Because this contention is essentially a reiteration
of Corwin's earlier argument that the use of nuclear weapons would
cause unnecessary suffering, cross application of those argument ap-
plies equally well here. As discussed earlier, the line between warfare
which affects combatants and that which affects civilians is an am-
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 18. Bright also addresses the effects of delayed fallout hazard, which produces
harmful physiological effects through direct ingestion of radioactive materials into the body.
Because radioactivity's injurious effects rapidly decline, Bright concludes that the harm to
individuals from delayed fallout would be de minimis. Id. Corwin's only response to Bright's
well-developed argument is that the issue remains "vigorously disputed." Despite this admis-
sion, he blithely concludes that nuclear weapons are poisonous agents under the Protocol.
57. Corwin, supra note 1, at 277.
58. Westing, Towards Eliminating the Scourge of Chemical War, 16 BULL. PEACE
PROP. 117, 117-18 (1985).
59. Shaw, Nuclear Weapons and International Law, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 1, 15 (I. Pogany ed. 1987).
60. Corwin, supra note 1, at 278; see also Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare (1923) art.
24(3); see also Geneva Protocol I Additional Relation to the Protection of Victims of Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Geneva Protocol].
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biguous one.6"
Additionally, as Corwin admits, neither the Hague Convention
nor the Geneva Protocol are binding international agreements.
Corwin seeks to minimize the significance of this fact by arguing
that both treaties "reflect the present state of customary interna-
tional law."'62 This contention is questionable for several reasons.
First, neither of the authorities that Corwin cites to support this pro-
position63 unequivocally state that either treaty constitutes custom-
ary international law. One source is only willing to contend that the
Hague Draft Rules on Aerial Warfare "provide some evidence" that
customary international law precludes the use of weapons that would
cause indiscriminate suffering to a civilian population. 4 The other
commentator is even more equivocating, maintaining only that it is
"probable" that the 1977 Protocol is declaratory of "emerging cus-
tomary law." 5
Additionally, it is important to examine the actual practice of
States in armed conflict to determine if the principles outlined above
realistically govern their conduct in times of war. It has been ob-
served that:
In no other field of international law is practice so impor-
tant; the stakes involved are humanitarian standards. But at-
tempts to apply the principle beyond the actual practice of
States in armed conflict would be tantamount to raising illu-
sions. Resort to barbarous practices in a major conflict between
the major States would amount to a retreat from the humanita-
rian standards so far attained. But the realities of such circum-
stances would compel us to apply lower standards to the practi-
cal application of the principle and rules of law of war. The
treaties, codifications of rules in international agreements, and
international agreements in general which seek to impose
greater reasonableness and higher standards of humanity all de-
pend in their application and their outcomes upon practice. This
is what "respect" for the law of war is all about.66
An analysis of state practice seriously undermines Corwin's as-
sertion that nations have come to accept limits on the right to target
civilian population centers. During World War I, air warfare was
initially restricted to military objectives in the actual theatre of oper-
ations. As the war progressed, the scope of targets expanded to in-
61. See supra text accompanying notes 24-46.
62. Corwin, supra note 1, at 279.
63. See id. at n.36.
64. Nuclear Weapons and International Law, supra note 2, at 565.
65. Weston, supra note 2, at 567.
66. Almond, Law and Armed Conflict: Some of the Shared Policies, 9 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 175, 186 (1977). See also Nurick, The Distinction Between Combatant and NonCom-
batant In The Law Of War, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 680, 683 (1945).
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clude factories and communication centers. By the end of the con-
flict, both the Allied and Axis powers were bombing urban areas in
an effort to undermine civilian morale.6 At the very least, the major
actors in the war clearly deemed it legitimate to attack military
targets without regard for incidental civilian casualties that might
occur: "[I]n general one principle seems to have been followed in the
war: that military objectives could be bombed wherever found, re-
gardless of their location, and, it seems regardless of the injury to
non-combatants and private property. 8
In the period between the two world wars, several endeavors
were made to establish guidelines to protect civilian lives and prop-
erty during armed conflict, including the drafting of the Hague Reg-
ulations on Aerial Warfare and the efforts of the League of Nations
Disarmament Commission. 9 Despite these efforts, the distinction be-
tween combatants and noncombatants was all but obliterated in
World War II.
Under the British Directive on Air Warfare in October of 1942,
the Cabinet authorized bombing of civilian targets in Japan, Ger-
many and Italy as a means of undermining "enemy morale."7 Simi-
larly, the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the Casablanca Directive of
1943 authorized the "progressive destruction and dislocation of the
German military, industrial and economic system and the undermin-
ing of the morale of the German people to a point where their capac-
ity for armed resistance is fatally weakened." '71
Thus, the practice of belligerent states in World War II was
marked by an almost total disregard for the protection of civilian
populations:
By the time that the [atomic] weapons were used, the Sec-
ond World War had produced enormous destruction from con-
ventional weapons and the destruction had been continuing for
over four years. Tolerances had already developed with respect
to the bombing of major Japanese and European cities. The de-
struction resulting from those massive conventional attacks was
greater than that caused by the atomic bombs at Nagasaki and
Hiroshima. The targeting of cities as "strategic" and legitimate
military targets had been fully established, and the Nuremberg
Tribunal did not address such attacks, nor declare them to be
unlawful. Accordingly, reciprocal tolerances, already estab-
lished, led to an acceptance of the attacks with nuclear
67. Nurick, supra note 66, at 694.
68. S. ROYSE, AERIAL BOMBARDMENT 193 (1928); see also C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 663 (1922).
69. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 413 (1940).
70. INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS COMMITTEE, DRAFT RULES FOR THE LIMITATION OF THE
DANGERS INCURRED BY THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN TIME OF WAR 163 (1956).
71. W. CRAVEN & L. CATE, 2 THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II 305 (1949).
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weapons.7"
State practice subsequent to World War II has, tragically, only
reinforced this conception of total war. Post World War II treaties,
including the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War
Victims,7" the Hague Convention of 1954 on the Protection of Cul-
tural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 7' and the Draft Rules
for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by Civilian Population in
Time of War 5 provide very little protection for civilian populations
in time of war.76 State conduct in armed conflicts in recent years,
including the bombing of major civilian population centers by both
sides in the Iraqi-Iranian conflict,"7 evince no intention to recognize
the sanctity of noncombatants. The reality is that:
[Liegitimate targets are no longer limited to military objec-
tives, even if extensively interpreted, but extend to centres of
communications, large industrial administrative establishments
of any kind and any area likely to become important for the
conduct of war . . . If the principle of the immunity of non-
combatants is limited to those categories of the civilian popula-
tion who, from the point of view of the war effort, are irrelevant
and are located in areas of which the same can be said, this
principle appears to represent a correct, but hardly any longer
significant, abstraction from the relevant rules of warfare.78
The breakdown of the distinction between combatants and civil-
ians severely undermines Corwin's analysis. While independent prin-
ciples, such as proportionality, would prevent the use of nuclear
weapons in a wholly indiscriminate fashion, it is clear that they are
not rendered illegal per se simply because their use might result in
incidental civilian casualties.
72. Almond, Deterrence and a Policy-Oriented Perspective on the Legality of Nuclear
Weapons, in Miller & Feinrider, supra note 2, at 59. The total disregard for noncombatants
was also demonstrated by the practice of unrestricted submarine warfare against neutral ship-
ping by both sides in the war. As a consequence, while the German admirals Doenitz and
Rader were convicted before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg for this prac-
tice, no sentence was imposed because of similar practices on the part of the Allied powers.
JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR
WAR CRIMINALS 107-112 (1946).
73. 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (1950).
74. 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (1954).
75. D. Schindler & J. Toman, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 187 (1982) citing Draft
Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War,
International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva (2d ed. 1958).
76. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 51, at 192.
77. Missile Message, Economist, Mar. 5, 1988, at 44; Trainor, Iraq: Missile With Ex-
tended Range Is New Peril To Iran's Cities and Oil, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1988, at 10.
78. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 51, at 192.
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E. Inviolability of the Territoriality of Neutrals
In this section, Corwin asserts that the use of nuclear weapons
would violate the territorial rights of neutral third party nations, cit-
ing article 1 of the Hague Convention for this proposition. He fur-
ther suggests that only "most limited" potential uses of nuclear
weapons would not contravene this principle. 9
These contentions are dubious for several reasons. First, Corwin
incorrectly asserts, without any substantiation, that only the use of a
very limited number of nuclear weapons would fail to affect the in-
terests of neutral nations. In reality, the efforts of both the Soviet
Union and the United States to develop a pentomic8 ° combat strat-
egy has resulted in the deployment of thousands of tactical nuclear
weapons with warhead yields as low as 0.01 kilotons. 81 The use of
limited numbers of such weapons on the battlefield of Europe, for
example, would not threaten neutral nations with radioactive fallout
or residual blast effects. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact are cur-
rently working on a new generation of battlefield munitions that
would produce damage not much greater than that for many conven-
tional armaments. These weapons would also minimize collateral
damage to surrounding populations.82 Even one of the most respected
proponents of the theory that nuclear weapons are illegal under most
circumstances concedes that the limited use of nuclear weapons on
the battlefield might avoid encroaching on the rights of neutral
States.83 While Corwin might contest the probability that a tactical
nuclear exchange would remain "limited," this is, at most, a question
of the possible misuse of such weapons and does not implicate their
legality per se.
Additionally, even an exchange involving higher-yield strategic
nuclear weapons would not necessarily threaten third party nations.
As several analysts have explained, the airburst of a nuclear war-
head at slightly less than 100,000 feet would prevent the production
of significant amounts of radioactive fallout that could drift over the
79. Corwin, supra note 1, at 279.
80. O'Brien, Some Problems Of The Law Of War In Limited Nuclear Warfare, 27 MIL.
L. REV. 1, 1 (1961). The term "pentomic" refers to the development of nuclear and conven-
tional forces which could operate under the conditions of a limited war. One of the important
elements of a pentomic strategy is the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. Id.
81. SIPRI, supra note 6, at 44-53. Weapons deployed by the United States in this cate-
gory include approximately 2400 low yield artillery nuclear shells that can be launched from
howitzers or towed guns and 200 low yield atomic demolition munitions (ADMs). Id. at 44.
The United States also deploys about 1400 antisubmarine weaopns (ASWs) in this category
also. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, BULL. ATOM. Sci., June, 1987, at 56. Soviet tactical
weapons are also deployed as artillery and ADMs. Additionally, the Soviets deploy tactical
nuclear weapons as antisubmarine weapons. SIPRI, supra note 53.
82. Klare, Leaping The Firebreak, in THE NUCLEAR READER 169-71 (C. Kegley & E.
Wittkopf eds. 1985).
83. Weston, supra note 2, at 583.
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border into neutral nations.84 Indeed, one study estimates that a low
air burst would provide a "99 percent assurance of not producing
fallout." '8 Both the Soviet Union and the United States are develop-
ing a new generation of nuclear weapons designed for this low air
burst detonation. For example, the new Soviet SS-21s, 22s and 23s
are designed for one or two kiloton air bursts that would produce
negligible fallout. 86 It has been estimated that such weapons may
disperse radiation no more than 500 yards from their targets.8"
Given the fact that low air burst explosions of nuclear warheads
would produce "the best 'across the board' damage to most tactical
targets," 88 these weapons could most likely be utilized in a interna-
tionally legal manner.
Finally, the rights of innocent third party nations to be free
from the incidental harm that could result from a nuclear exchange
between combatants must be weighed against the inherent right of
States to insure their own survival. This right of national survival
has been recognized throughout history: "traditional international
law, adapting itself to the political necessities of international life,
and basing itself on the principle of self-preservation, permits States
a wide range of action to ensure the protection of their own rights,
safety and existence."89 The Nuremberg tribunal also acknowledged
the primacy of this right, stating that "[T]he principle of self-preser-
vation, in its various manifestations, is so fundamental that no sys-
tem of law can possibly ignore it."9
Given the saliency of this interest, the right to use nuclear
weapons, even in derogation of the rights of third party states, would
arguably be permitted under certain circumstances. Consider, for ex-
ample, the following scenario. Nation X has launched a limited first
strike against Nation Y, resulting in millions of deaths in Nation Y.
Nation X has communicated its intention to launch further strikes
against Y in a short period of time, with the apparent intention of
annihilating the population of that nation. Under the principle of
self-preservation, a good argument could be made that Nation Y
would have the right to launch a counterforce second strike on State
X's nuclear installations in an effort to eliminate that nation's capa-
bility to launch another strike against Y. While Y's second strike
would probably result in some incidental casualties in nations bor-
84. Bright, supra note 50, at 11; Note, supra note 41, at 513.
85. U.S. Dep't of Army, Field Manual No. 191-31-3, Nuclear Weapons Employment
Effects Data 3 (1968).
86. Gallois & Train, When A Nuclear Strike Is Thinkable, THE NUCLEAR READER 101
(C. Kegley & E. Wittkopf, ed. 1985).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Weightmann, Self Defense In International Law, 37 VA. L. REV. 1095, 1114 (1951).
90. German Major War Criminals Case, 1 I.M.T. (Nuremberg) 171, 220 (1946).
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dering State X (and perhaps State Y), the right of national self-
preservation would arguably outweigh the neutral nation's interest.
While it is beyond argument that this would be a tragic consequence
of State Y's decision, the alternative of acquiescing in the oblitera-
tion of a nation appears far worse.
F. Defenses
1. Military Necessity and Proportionality.-Corwin suggests
that the doctrine of military necessity is mediated by the principle of
proportionality which "balances the legitimacy of military ends
against the means used to achieve these ends."91 While touting pro-
portionality as a "useful framework for evaluating the lawfulness of
all military tactics," 92 Corwin is forced to acknowledge that the
"balancing test" that inheres to this concept necessarily requires
highly subjective interpretations of data and the weighing of princi-
ples that cannot easily be compared with any kind of exactitude.9"
Despite these imposing problems with the proportionality test,
Corwin somehow proceeds to apply the standard and concludes that
nuclear weapons would be illegal under most plausible scenarios be-
cause of the "inhumane quality" of radioactive fallout, and the pur-
portedly greater amount of destruction that such weapons would
cause in comparison with conventional weapons. 94
Corwin's conclusions are troubling for several reasons. First, he
fails to acknowledge the possibility that nations might choose to use
air burst detonations of nuclear weapons, virtually negating the haz-
ard of radioactive fallout. 95 Second, the fact that the use of nuclear
weapons might cause greater damage than conventional counterparts
is simply not germane to the question of proportionality. As indi-
cated earlier in this paper, the doctrine of proportionality requires
the balancing of the saliency of the military objective against the loss
of human life and property that is likely to result from a contem-
plated military action.9" It does not require, as Corwin implies, a
comparison with other available means to reach the same objective.
Additionally, while it is unassailable that virtually any single
strategic nuclear weapon would produce more destruction than a sin-
gle conventional weapon, it is inconceivable that conventional arms
would be used in such a limited fashion. Thus, the relevant consider-
ation must be a comparison of plausible combat scenarios in which
nuclear weapons or conventional armaments might be used. For ex-
91. Corwin, supra note 1, at 281.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 282.
94. Id.
95. See note 84 and accompanying text.
96. See note 32 and accompanying text.
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ample, a nation might choose to drop a single nuclear bomb on a city
to exact terms of surrender, such as the attacks on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki in 1945. 9v Alternatively, that nation might choose to
launch a massive bombing raid with conventional armaments. Under
these circumstances, it is not a foregone conclusion that the nuclear
attack would necessarily cause more casualties. For example, as one
commentator has observed:
We must not forget for a minute that other kinds of weap-
ons also are capable of destroying people by the millions. Even
during World War II, a conventional raid on Tokyo with high
explosive and incendiary bombs killed more people in one night
than either of the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima or Nagasaki.98
Similarly, during three bombing raids on Hamburg from July 24 to
July 30, 1943, 700 Allied planes delivered about 1,300 tons of high-
explosive bombs, 500 tons of oil incendiaries and 600 tons of magne-
sium incendiaries. One of these raids resulted in an estimated 50-
60,000 fatalities, approaching the carnage at Hiroshima.99
Finally, as Corwin once again admits, it is chimerical to attempt
to "weigh" the value of a "military objective" against the loss of
lives and property damage because no objective weight can be as-
signed to the former concept. The principle of proportionality thus
remains hostage to the wholly subjective assessments of sovereign
nations, precluding any definitive determination of the legality of nu-
clear weapons. Indeed States have failed to arrive at a minimal com-
mon understanding of the meaning and scope of fluid concepts such
as "military objectives" or "necessity":
The fundamental policy which underlies the various analo-
gies invoked with respect to nuclear weapons, as well as the
prohibitions with respect to all other weapons and indeed the
law of war generally, is the minimum destruction of values-that
is, the balancing of "military necessity" or "legitimate objec-
tives" against "humanitarianism" and the disproportionate or ir-
relevant destruction of values. The Achilles heel in this policy is
• . . that the decision-makers of the world community have
never been able to become very precise about the "legitimate
objectives" of violence, or hence, about the degree of destruction
permissible under "military necessity" .
97. DeGarmo & Richards, supra note 19, at 9.
98. Id.
99. Postol, Possible Fatalities From Superfires Following Nuclear Attacks In Or Near
Urban Areas, in THE MEDICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR WAR (National Academy of Sci-
ence, 1985) at 51-52.
100. McDouglas & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Test In Perspective: Lawful Measures
For Security, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 648, 689 (1955); see also Dunbar, Military Necessity in War
Crimes Trials 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 442 (1952).
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2. Reprisals and Self-defense.-In his treatment of the law of
reprisals and self-defense, Corwin correctly contends at the outset
that the United Nations Charter has obviated the traditional right of
nations to launch reprisals in response to the unlawful actions of
other nations. 1 ' However, his subsequent assertion that nuclear
weapons could never be used as a means of self-defense simply fails
to comport with relevant principles of international law. Under Arti-
cle 51 of the Charter, a nation or collective group of nations may
exercise the right of self-defense "if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United nations, until the Security Counsel has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security."''
Corwin argues that there are three principal scenarios under
which nuclear weapons could be used in self-defense, concluding in
each case that the utilization of these weapons would be an illicit
response. The first hypothetical that he poses is an attack upon a
nation with conventional weapons. Invoking the principle of propor-
tionality, Corwin contends the "vast disparity in magnitude between
any nuclear weapons and any conventional means of warfare" would
render any nuclear response disproportionate to the initial attack."'
There are several serious flaws in Corwin's analysis. First, as
early as World War II, it was possible to launch an attack with
highly destructive conventional weapons that could result in more
casualties and damage to property than an attack with nuclear
weapons. 104 This scenario has become even more plausible in recent
years as nations have initiated development of conventional weapons
with damage potentials commensurate with many nuclear arms." 5
Additionally, Corwin once against proffers the unfair compari-
son of an attack with a single conventional weapon and a single nu-
clear weapon in his hypothetical. Consider, for example, the far
more credible scenario of an offensive against Western Europe by
the Warsaw Pact. Such an attack would involve hundreds of
thousands of troops, tens of thousands of tanks and thousands of
ground-attack and land-combat aircraft,'06 and would obviously im-
peril the lives of tens of millions in Western and Eastern Europe.
Under such circumstances, Corwin would be hard pressed to argue
that a counterattack with low yield battlefield tactical weapons could
101. Corwin, supra note 1, at 283 citing U.N. Charter, art. 51.
102. U.N. Charter, art. 51.
103. Corwin, supra note 1, at 284.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
105. Klare, supra note 82, at 171.
106. Borawski, Practical Steps for Building Confidence in Europe, 18 ARMS CONTROL
TODAY, Mar., 1988, at 17; 'INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILI-
TARY BALANCE 224-27 (1986); J. STEELE, SOVIET POWER 76-78 (1984).
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not be plausibly considered a proportionate response. 10 7
The second scenario presented by Corwin involves a nuclear re-
sponse to a nuclear attack. While admitting that this situation
presents the "strongest case" for permitting the use of nuclear weap-
ons, Corwin ultimately rejects their legitimacy even under these cir-
cumstances.108 Corwin contends that the right to self-defense is lim-
ited to preventing further attacks on the State and thus would
preclude reprisals, including attacks on civilian populations. Thus, he
asserts that a nation could only launch a full scale counterforce as-
sault in response to a nuclear attack, which would be disproportion-
ate under virtually all circumstances, or a more limited counter-
strike, which would not achieve the objective of self-defense because
it would not obviate the opponent's ability to launch a second-
strike.10 9
Corwin's conception of self-defense and nuclear strategy is both
muddled and fundamentally incorrect. First, a nuclear strike by
State Y against State X's civilian population in response to a nuclear
strike by State X could be construed as an act of self-defense, rather
than reprisal, if there was a reasonable basis to believe that this
would deter State X from launching any further attacks because of
the horrible consequences of further countervalue responses by State
Y. Of course, State Y's contemplated action would still have to be
analyzed under other relevant principles of international law. How-
ever, the point to be made here is that there is nothing in the text of
the United Nations Charter,110 or the travaux preparatiores,"' that
limits a nation's responses to an attack to military targets.
Second, it is also plausible that State Y might launch a limited
first strike against State X and then present an ultimatum of surren-
der, a scenario that defense analysts have often suggested.' Under
such circumstances, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter" 3
would appear to permit State X to launch a proportionate second
strike in an effort to deter any further use of nuclear weapons by
State Y-a quintessential example of self-defense. In order to prop-
107. Corwin also fails to acknowledge that the limited use of nuclear weapons might be
deemed a proportionate response to an attack with chemical or biological agents, both of which
could be used as weapons of mass destruction. See, e.g, McFadden, The Second Review Con-
ference Of The Biological Weapons Convention: One Step Forward, Many More To Go, 24
STAN. J. INT'L L. 85, 109 (1987); Hoeber, The Neglected Threat of Chemical Warfare, 3
INT'L SECURITY 55, 60 (1978).
108. Corwin, supra note 1, at 284.
109. Id. at 284-85.
110. Article 51 of the Charter provides, in part, that "nothing in the present Charter
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a member of the United Nations . . . .U.N. Charter, art. 51.
111. McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 32, at 233-36.
112. Meinel, Fighting MAD, TECH. REV.., Apr., 1984, at 34.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02.
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erly defend itself, it is by no means certain that a nation would be
compelled to launch an all out second strike that would cripple an
opponent's nuclear forces to avert further attacks by the opponent. A
simple demonstration of the resolve to escalate, if necessary, might
prove to be an adequate means of defense, and would appear to be
sanctioned by Article 51. Corwin's failure to account for this possi-
bility renders his discussion of this scenario incomplete and tenuous.
The final scenario contemplated by Corwin is the use of nuclear
weapons in anticipatory self-defense. Corwin argues that nuclear
weapons could not be used under these circumstances because Arti-
cle 51 of the Charter limits the right of self-defense to armed at-
tacks. Additionally, he contends that the horrible implications of a
nuclear strike mandate that nations should be discouraged from ini-
tiating the use of such weapons.114
Corwin's contention that Article 51 only justifies the use of
force in response to an "armed attack" is by no means universally
accepted. Several commentators have argued that Article 51's provi-
sion for "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense"1'1 5
reflects the intent of the framers to preserve the broad traditional
right to self-defense formulated by Secretary of State Daniel Web-
ster in the Caroline incident, 1 6 which has been interpreted to in-
clude the right to engage in anticipatory self-defense under certain
circumstances.11 7 Corwin's position on this issue is internally incon-
sistent. After embracing Webster's conception of self-defense at the
outset of this section, and hence recognizing the legitimacy of antici-
patory self-defense in some cases, Corwin inexplicably argues later
114. Corwin, supra note 1, at 285.
115. U.N. Charter, art. 51.
116. The 1837 Caroline incident involved the decision of Great Britain to cross into
American territory to destroy a ship that was transporting personnel and equipment to rebels
in Canada. The British claimed that its actions were justified as an act of reasonable and
anticipatory self-defense. In a letter of protest to the British, Webster stated that self defense
could only be invoked as justification for the use of force where the necessity was "instant,
over-whelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation." 2 J. MOORE,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-14 (1906).
117. See, e.g., Mallison & Mallison, The Israeli Attack of June 7, 1981, Upon The
Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression Or Self Defense?, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417, 421
(1982); McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597,
599 (1963); Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in Interna-
tional Law, 81 RECUEIL DES COURS (II) 455, 495, 499 (1952).
Several other arguments have been proffered to counter the contention that Article 51
limits the right of self-defense to cases where an armed attack has already occurred. For ex-
ample, several commentators have cited the French text of Article 51 which refers justifies
self-defense in response to "armed aggression," as "giv[ing] weight to the theory that there
was no intention to cut down the general international law right of self defense against an
imminent threat." THOMAS & THOMAS, NONINTERVENTION 123-24 n.89 (1956); Waldock,
General Course On Public International Law, 91 RECUEIL DES COURS (II) 1, 234 (1962).
Waldock also argues that the French text of the relevant portion of Article 51 for the purposes
of this issue is not expressed in the form of a condition, suggesting that the English term "ir'
was intended to express a hypothesis rather than a condition. Id. at 235.
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in the section that the right to self-defense is limited to cases where
an armed attack has already occurred.118
I am much more sympathetic to Mr. Corwin's contention that
the international community should not allow anticipatory self-de-
fense in this context because of the possibility of mistake or abuse of
the right as pretext for aggression. However, it should be noted that
these are policy arguments that do not necessarily have the force of
law.
3. Other Considerations in Applying the Proportionality
Test.-Corwin next argues that a realistic application of the propor-
tionality test in this context must consider that a nuclear war per-
haps would not remain limited, and that the effects of nuclear weap-
ons are not wholly predictable. 1 9 In terms of the former contention,
relevant principles of international law distinguish between the po-
tential misuse of weapons, which may constitute a war crime, and
the determination of whether a weapon's use would be illegitimate
under all circumstances, rendering it illegal per se.'20 To the extent
that nuclear weapons could be used under certain circumstances
without violating jus in bello principles, Corwin's "Pandora's Box"
argument 2 is simply not germane.
In terms of the unpredictability of nuclear weapons, Corwin fur-
ther argues that it is uncertain that. nuclear weapons can be deliv-
ered with accuracy on their intended targets, and that unpredictable
climactic conditions may aggravate the harm caused by radioactive
fallout.'22 Corwin concludes that both these factors must be consid-
ered in determining whether a particular use of nuclear weapons
would comport with the principle of proportionality.
While Corwin's line of reasoning is unassailable, it is basically
tautological in that it states little more than: The use of nuclear
weapons is illegal unless legal principles for use are observed. This
premise fails given that an air burst detonation of a nuclear warhead
would virtually obviate the threat of radioactive fallout.12 Addition-
ally, the accuracy of nuclear warheads, including high yield strategic
missiles, has increased dramatically in recent years. For example,
the Soviet Union's new SS-21s, 22s, and 23s have only a 100 meter
circular error probable, 2 " as does the proposed American MX mis-
118. Corwin, supra note 1, at 284-85.
119. Id. at 286.
120. See supra Section 1iB of this text.
121. Corwin, supra note 1, at 286.
122. Id.
123. See notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
124. The "circular error of probability" is a measure of missile accuracy which repre-
sents the radius of a circle, centered on a target, within which 50% of the weapons aimed at
the target are expected to fall. Gallois & Train, supra note 86, at 101.
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sile.'26 Finally, the use of any weapons, including conventional arma-
ments, is likely to result in unintended, incidental damage. The basic
question is whether the projected effects of any proposed means of
combat are likely to be so indiscriminate as to violate relevant princi-
ples of international law. Corwin's arguments in this section, phrased
only in the most general of terms, do not support this likelihood and
thus fail to adequately demonstrate the illegality of nuclear weapons
per se.
4. Other Sources of Evidence for Determining Customary In-
ternational Law.-Corwin's final argument is that judicial prece-
dents and pronouncements by the U.N. General Assembly provide
further evidence that the use of nuclear weapons would violate cus-
tomary international law. In terms of judicial precedent, Corwin
.cites the Shimoda case which he admits is the only case in which a
judgment as to the legality of nuclear weapons has been rendered.1 26
Shimoda involved a suit brought by five Japanese citizens against
the Japanese government to recover damages for injuries sustained
as a consequence of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Naga-
saki. The plaintiffs contended that the use of atomic weapons vio-
lated conventional and customary principles of international law, cit-
ing international agreements that prohibit the use of poisonous gas;
restrict the use of aerial bombardment and attacks on civilians; and
forbid the use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering. 1 As
Corwin indicates, the Court upheld the plaintiffs' claims that the
bombings were indiscriminate, caused unnecessary suffering, violated
the Geneva Protocol and were not justified by principles of military
necessity. 128
Despite its holding, the Shimoda case is a frail reed for Corwin
to lean on for several reasons. First, as several commentators and
Corwin have observed, the Court took pains to emphasize that its
decision was limited to the facts of the case at bar."2 9 As a conse-
quence, it would be hazardous .to invoke the Court's holding to draw
more general conclusions about the legality of nuclear weapons. Sec-
ond, while the "cumulative effect of uniform decisions of the courts
of the most important States"110 may provide evidence of interna-
125. Id.
126. Corwin, supra note 287; see also Tokyo District Court, No. 2914 of 1955 and No.
4177 of 1957, Civil Affairs, 24th Department, Dec. 7, 1963, translated and reprinted in JAPA-
NESE ANNUAL OF INT'L L. 212 (1964) [hereinafter Shimoda].
127. Shimoda, supra note 126.
128. Corwin, supra note 1, at 288; see also Id.
129. Falk, The Shimoda Case: A Legal Appraisal Of The Atomic Attacks Upon Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 759, 769 (1965); see also Corwin, supra note 1, at
289.
130. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-32 (8th ed. 1955).
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tional custom, it is difficult to accord equal salience to one isolated
case decided by a lower municipal court over thirty years ago. 133
Corwin acknowledges the authoritative weaknesses of the Shimoda
case, but ultimately cites it as a potential "building block" for devel-
oping a consensus as to the illegality of nuclear weapons. 132 Unfortu-
nately, the massive buildup of nuclear weapons by the world's super-
powers in the last thirty years, as well as the decision of many other
nations to pursue this option, weakens this "building block" to the
point where it can provide only the most perilous of foundations for
Mr. Corwin's arguments. Thus, the significance of the Shimoda case
in addressing the issue at hand is open to serious debate.
Corwin's final argument is that the United Nations General As-
sembly's adoption of Resolution 1653 (XIV), condemning the use of
nuclear weapons, provides additional evidence that such weapons are
illegal under customary international law. 13 3 Corwin acknowledges
that U.N. resolutions are not in themselves declaratory of customary
international law. He suggests, however, that the absence of any use
of nuclear weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki is evidence that
this principle is now considered customary; and, at the very least, the
resolution provides evidence of the "present state of customary inter-
national law.' 34
Corwin's first argument, which essentially asserts that a princi-
ple of customary international law can arise by the mere absence of
contrary state action, fails to comport with generally-recognized
standards for establishing the existence of a principle of customary
international law. In order for a new rule of international customary
law to be reorganized, two elements must be proven: 1) "The prac-
tice of States, including those whose interests are specially affected,
must have been substantially or practically uniform;"'3 6 and 2)
"[State practice] must also be such, or carried out in a way, as to be
evidence of belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the evi-
dence of a rule of law requiring it . . . States . . . must therefore
feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obliga-
tion."13 6 This latter requirement is usually referred to as "opiniojuris.' ' 1137
131. See also Falk, supra note 132, at 781 ("premature to discuss the relevance of
Shimoda to an evolving international law of war applicable to the conditions of nuclear
warfare.")
132. Corwin, supra note 1, at 289.
133. Corwin, supra note I, at 288; see also G.A. Res. 1653, 16 U.N. GAOR Sup. (no.
17) 4, U.N. Doc. A/5166) (1961) [hereinafter U.N. Resolution].
134. Corwin, supra note 1, at 289.
135. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 1, 89-90 [hereinafter Fisheries];
see also Asylum Case (Columbia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. Reps. 266, 276-77.
136. Fisheries, supra note 135.
137. Jiminez, General Cause In Public International Law, 107 RECUEIL DES COURS (I)
1, 22 (1978).
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Thus, the mere fact that a State has consistently acted, or not
acted, in a given way, is clearly insufficient to establish a new princi-
ple of customary international law in the absence of proof of opinio
juris. As the International Court of Justice declared in the North
Sea Continental Shelf judgment:
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled prac-
tice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way,
as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obliga-
tory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for
such a belief, ie. the existence of a subjective element, is implicit
in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The
States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to
what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or even ha-
bitual character of the acts is not in itself enough.'38
Moreover, Corwin never demonstrates that nuclear States have
abstained from the use of nuclear armaments as the consequence of
a subjective belief that this action would violate a principle of inter-
national law. Rather, most commentators suggest that the world has
been spared the ravages of nuclear war because of the perception
that a nuclear attack would be responded to in kind, the principle of
"mutually assured destruction."1 9
Corwin's second argument, that the U.N. Resolution is evidence
of customary international law, fares no better upon close scrutiny.
First, even assuming that a single resolution can constitute "consis-
tent state practice" for the purposes of establishing a new principle
of customary international law, the fact that forty-six nations either
voted against the Resolution or abstained, negates any claim that
State practice is "practically uniform:"
[T]o regard such resolutions [1653 (XVI) and other similar
resolutions] as creative of law simpliciter is naive and mislead-
ing. They reflect widespread concern and political force and not,
as yet at least, a legal consensus. The fact that the leading nu-
clear powers (with the arguable exception of the Soviet Union)
are strongly opposed to such formulations as law is of the great-
est importance in the process of customary law formation. It
may, of course, be that in the course of time and in the light of
modified attitudes on the part of the major nuclear weapons
powers, such Assembly resolutions may reflect or constitute a
customary rule, but it would be premature to state that this had
138. 1969 I.C.J. 42.
139. See, e.g., B. BUZAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC STUDIES 167-68 (1987);
Nye, Ethics And The Nuclear Future, 42 THE WORLD TODAY Aug./Sept. 1985, at 151; Al-
mond, Deterrence Processes and Minimum Order, 4 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 283,
286 (1983); Y. HARKAKI, NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR PEACE 2-3 (1966).
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already occurred." 0O
Also, most scholars contend that in addition to proof of virtual uni-
form practice, a principle cannot be said to constitute customary in-
ternational law in the absence of "consent of an overwhelming ma-
jority of States of each group - socialist, developed capitalist and
developing countries.""' United Nations Resolution 1653 (xvi), re-
jected by several important Western nations - including Britain,
France and the United States - clearly does not meet these require-
ments. Finally, as the International Court of Justice indicated in the
Fisheries case, it is particularly important that those nations whose
interests are "specially affected" by an emerging principle of cus-
tomary international law accept the principle." 2 In the context of
nuclear weapons, this would obviously require those nations that cur-
rently possess such weapons to acknowledge that their use would be
illegal. In reality, virtually all nations who possess such weapons, in-
cluding the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union,
have consistently expressed the intention to use them under at least
some circumstances.
III. The Interface of Nuclear Weapons and International Law
I have attempted to demonstrate in the previous section of this
article that current principles of international law simply do not
render the possession or use of nuclear weapons per se illegal. In this
section, I will suggest that in the current world climate, it would be
both chimerical and counterproductive to continue to attempt to in-
voke this "law" against the nations of the world.
While it is often rather disheartening to admit, the ultimate via-
bility of international law continues to rest on the often precarious
foundation of the voluntary consent of sovereign nations:
Consent is a crucial element in the overall functioning of
effective international law, and any theory that disregards it is
certain to experience severe problems in compliance, when
looked at from the normative viewpoint, and in accuracy, when
looked at from the descriptive viewpoint. This is so because,
without organs of magisterial competence, international law
must avoid unilateral commands and gain compliance by elicit-
ing the support of States. This is the reason for the heavy reli-
140. Shaw, supra note 59, at 13. See also Lisle, Nuclear Weapons: A Conservative Ap-
proach to Treaty Interpretation, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 275, 277 (1983).
141. Alexidze, Legal Nature of Jus Cogens, 110 RECUEIL DES COURS 227, 247 (1981);
see also Arbitral Award on the Merits in Dispute between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Com-
pany and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic , 17 I.L.M. 1, 28 (1978); Lazarev,
International Legal Custom At A Contemporary Stage, 19 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 511, 513
(1980).
142. Fisheries, supra note 135, at 89-90.
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ance on consent in the traditional theory. 4
Thus, international legal scholars often attempt to generate new
norms of international law solely on the basis of "the self-evident
improvement to mankind that would result from a centralised system
of enforcement,"144 with little regard for the actual predisposition of
sovereign States to consent to these principles. It is thus relevant to
seek to determine if the pursuit of Corwin, and others, to render
nuclear weapons "illegal" is likely to be fruitful at any time in the
near future.
It has been suggested that any purported principle of interna-
tional law must be tested for "credibility," this being defined as the
current willingness of national actors to consent to be bound by the
principle, and the likelihood that they will continue to adhere to this
principle in the future.14 5 A three part test to determine the credibil-
ity of an alleged international legal principle formulated by
Schwarzenberger is particularly germane to this pursuit. While the
test is framed in the context of international treaties, the principles
that are established therein are generalizable to the operation of the
international law system as a whole. These elements are:
1) The Degree of Integration of the Environment of Trea-
ties: Does a particular draft comport with the existing interna-
tional legal environment, or is its realization contingent on a
dramatic change in the structure of the environment?
2) Homogeneity of the Contracting Parties: Does the reali-
zation of the draft depend on homogeneous actor in spheres such
as constitutional law or cultural norms?
3) Minimal Ethical Common Denominator: What is requi-
site minimal ethical common denominator that will ensure effec-
tive operation of the agreement? 146
Application of the first two of these factors clearly demonstrates why
it is futile to make the claim that nuclear weapons are "illegal" in
the absence of international support for such a principle.
A. Integration of the Legal Environment
The transition from a world pervaded by nuclear weapons to
one in which such weapons are acknowledged to be illegal would re-
quire a dramatic transformation of attitudes by many important na-
143., Watson, A Realistic Jurisprudence of International; Law, Y.B. WLD. AFF. 265, 274
(1980) [hereinafter Watson]; see also Tammes, The Life Of The International Obligation
And Of Its Subjects, 31 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 5 (1984).
144. Watson, supra note 120, at 268.
145. Schwarzenberger, The Credibility of International Law, Y.B. INT'L AFF. 292, 292-
93 (1983).
146. This is a paraphrase of Schwartzenberger's articulation. Id.
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tional actors in the contemporary international legal environment.
The dominant interests of the contemporary State are its "existence,
independence and territorial integrity."1 47 Tragically, the world's su-
perpowers, as well as several other nations, have deemed it essential
to develop a nuclear weapons' capability to adequately protect these
interests. Given the seemingly intractable mistrust that surrounds
the relations of some of the most important nuclear states, it is
highly unlikely that we can expect a fundamental change in attitudes
any time in the near future.14 8 Without the assent of these nations,
any effort to declare nuclear weapons "illegal" will necessarily
amount to nothing more than an empty aspiration. " 9
B. Homogeneity of the Relevant State Actors
The primary adversaries in the nuclear arms race today -
NATO and the Warsaw Pact - represent polarized ideological sys-
tems that are often in direct conflict throughout the world. Such a
charged environment is hardly conducive to the serious negotiations
that would be necessary to establish a consensus that nuclear weap-
ons are illegal. Beyond the superpowers and their allies, nations in
conflict such as Israel and Iraq; India and Pakistan; and Brazil and
Argentina completely lack the cultural or political homogeneity that
would engender meaningful cooperation in this context. Thus, under
a "real world-oriented" definition of "international legal principle,"
the theory that nuclear weapons are illegal, or may become so in the
near future, is unfortunately erroneous.
IV. Nuclear Weapons and the Realistic Role of International Law
The conclusions that I have drawn in this article are by no
means intended to imply that there is no legitimate role for interna-
tional law, or lawyers, in our efforts to rid the world of the scourge
of nuclear weapons. Rather, I have merely attempted to demonstrate
that efforts to effectuate this result by attempting to ascertain the
"legality" or "illegality" of nuclear weapons are likely to be futile.
147. Bos, Will and Order in The Nation-State System: Observations on Positivism and
Positive International Law, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ES-
SAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE 51, 60 (R. MacDonald & D. Johnston, eds. 1984).
148. See, e.g., Roling, International Law, Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control and Dis-
armament, in Miller & Feinrider, supra note 2, at 183:
However, if one party disarms, the weapons of the opponent become usable
once more, for the fear of retaliation no longer exists. The nation-at-arms now
has an absolute superiority of force. This is an unacceptable situation. History
teaches us that states are inclined to misbehave in proportion to their power,
hence the need to possess nuclear arms in order to maintain a power balance and
ensure that the opponent's weapons remain unusable.
149. De Vree, The Political Conditions Of International Law, 26 NETH. INT'L L. REV.
46, 56 (1979).
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Relevant principles of international law simply do not render nuclear
weapons illegal and thus are a direct reflection of the belief of many
nations that possession of nuclear weapons remains necessary in a
world where the use of force is far too often the primary instrument
of "law." Moreover, efforts to determine the legal status of nuclear
weapons simply detract from pursuing other options that might be
more viable.
In recent months, the Soviet Union and the United States
achieved a dramatic breakthrough in nuclear arms negotiations
when they agreed to scrap their respective intermediate nuclear
weapons force in Europe. 150 However, there is no evidence that this
agreement was effectuated because of a belief that such weapons
were illegal. Rather, it appears that both sides perceived that the
agreement would enhance stability in Europe and establish the
groundwork for future negotiations on strategic arms. In short, ap-
peals to self-interest are the primary dynamic in successful arms ne-
gotiations in the contemporary world.
Thus, the "table skills" of attorneys may play an important role
in negotiating effective arms control agreements that can help to re-
duce the risk of nuclear war in the future. 151 The conclusions of an
international lawyer provide perhaps the most realistic and encour-
aging perspective on the future role of attorneys in this process:
From a lawyer's perspective, I must say that I do not think
our time is most usefully spent assessing the status and legiti-
macy of nuclear weapons under international law. This brings to
mind the remark of a representative from a developing country
in response to a proposed United Nations resolution- which
would have condemned the use of nuclear weapons as a crime
against humanity. In a few and well chosen words, he expressed
his disbelief that grown men were debating the legal implica-
tions of the destruction of the world. I too believe we have some-
thing more urgent to do with our time. We need to meet the
nontheoretical challenge of designing realistic agreements that
are verifiable and designing mechanisms for ensuring compli-
ance and resolving disputes. Little by little, we may then be able
to build the confidence in the effectiveness of arms control
agreements which is essential to the negotiation of other
agreements.151
150. Wanke, INF Treaty A Good Start, Bull. Atom. Sci. (Mar. 1988) at 18; Guldin, As
Expected, Supreme Soviet Gives INF Treaty Warm Welcome, Arms Control Today, Apr.
1988, at 22.
151. Weston, Answering the Nuclear Question: The Modern Lawyer's Role, 9 BROOK-
LYN J. INT'L L. 201, 207 (1983).
152. Hoinkes, The United Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament: A Progress
Report, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 219, 225-26 (1983).
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